The relationship between war and reform in Russian History.
For over two decades, power in Russia has been personified by one man: Vladimir Putin. Under his rule any hopes of post-Soviet freedom and opportunity for the Russian people have been replaced with autocracy, repression of critics, and the dominance of state misinformation. But the cracks in his corrupt edifice may be emerging. Like so many times, war might be bringing major change to Russia.
Throughout modern Russian history, but particularly in the nineteenth century, military success and reform in Russia were inversely correlated. This meant that military defeat tended to be followed by rapid social and political reform.
After Russia’s comprehensive defeat at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1807 at Austerlitz, the Russian Tsar Alexander I appointed Mikhail Sperensky as his leading minister with a mandate to implement far reaching reforms. Sperensky’s vision for a reformed Russian state was impressive, and included the creation of a national Duma (parliament) as well as a series of provincial Dumas. An appointed State Council would act as an upper chamber to the Duma. Ultimately only the State Council became a reality under Alexander I and even that was altered to act merely as an advisory body. Nevertheless, Sperensky’s vision for reform reflected a sense of crisis imparted by the defeat at Austerlitz, a sense that Russia needed to reform to avoid being dominated by its European rivals.
A similar reforming mood struck Russia after the fall of Sevastopol in 1855 and the defeat to the British and the French in the Crimean War. Crimea demonstrated the obsolescence of the Russian war economy built, as it was, on the back of antiquated institutions like serfdom and a nepotistic military. Therefore, in the years following the defeat in the Crimea, the ‘Great Reforms’ of Tsar Alexander II were enacted; most notably the abolition of serfdom in 1861, meritocratic reforms of the military, and the establishment of local government called zemstva. These reforms represented an attempt at the modernisation of Russia and the beginnings of transforming the national economy from one based on feudal agriculture to an industrialised force capable of competing with the West.[1]
The Tsarist regime was ultimately undone by defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and the horror and brutality of the First World War. Faced with the humiliation and misery of both defeats, the Tsar was no longer able to command the respect of the military, one of the key pillars of their rule. Without military respect and support, mutinies spread, soldiers joined with revolutionaries and ultimately the Soviet Union was born.
More recently, in the late 1980s it can be argued that the reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika enacted by Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, had their roots in the war in Afghanistan. As the Soviet military machine became more and more stuck in a 10-year stalemate costing billions, the need for political and social reform became evident. What followed was an unparalleled period of increasing freedoms in Russia. Defeat in war had, once again, sent shockwaves through the Russian state.
In Austerlitz, Sevastopol, and Afghanistan we have examples of how defeat led to rapid political reform. Conversely, military success resulted in the opposite, the reinforcement of autocracy. In fact the reason Sperensky’s reforms were not fully realised was the turning of the tide in the war with Napoleon. The great, immensely symbolic, defeat of Napoleon’s Grande Armée in 1812, followed by Napoleon’s ultimate defeat in 1815, proved to the autocracy that major reform was not required after all. Thus, instead of Sperensky’s dream of a constitutional monarchy, defeat of Napoleon ushered in ‘a forty year period of ultra-conservativism at home and counter-revolutionary intervention abroad.’[2] Military defeat brought change, victory simply strengthened the autocracy.
Putin’s two decades of power have so far been associated with military triumph. In Chechnya (1999), Georgia (2008), and Crimea (2014) Putin’s ruthless and swift military action has been largely successful, if brutal. The end result has been the reinforcement of his authority within the elite of the Russian state, the silencing of critics and the reduction of freedoms.
But now, something different is occurring. The war in Ukraine is not going as planned. A series of impressive Ukrainian counterattacks have resulted in the liberation of many key towns around Kharkiv. Now the old pressure for reform in Russia that has always followed military defeat is cranking up. Protests in Moscow are increasing and even the ultra loyalist spokespeople of Russian media have begun expressing doubts.
Perhaps, like with so many defeats before it, Putin’s failure in Ukraine will bring about greater freedoms for the Russian people and regime change. Or maybe you cannot predict the future from the past. Time will tell.
[1] Jonathan Frankel, ‘The war and the fate of the tsarist autocracy’ in The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War ed. Rotem Kowner (London: Routledge, 2007).
[2] Ibid.
Alex Blogker 